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“Knowledge comes through likeness. And so because the soul may know 
everything, it is never at rest until it comes to the original idea, in which all things 
are one. And there it comes to rest in God.“ 
Sermon 9 by Meister Eckhart, as translated in The Reading and Preaching of the 
Scriptures in the Worship of the Christian Church (1999) by Hughes Oliphant Old, Ch. 
9 : ‘The German Mystics’, p. 449  Grand Rapids, Michigan: Wm. B. Eerdmans. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION: A 21ST CENTURY WITTGENSTEIN? 
There is no attempt here to claim Pat Suppes for theism; while a “cradle catholic”, in 
that his mother, like this author,  was of western Ireland (specifically, O’Brien and 
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Costello) lineage, Pat was an atheist whose Catholicism ended, if not at his baptism, 
then with the death of his biological mother during his childhood. Nevertheless, the 
quote from Eckhart above, itself echoing St. Augustine, is meet for this questing, 
generous spirit. 
This writer dares to embark on a review of the Suppes opus only because Pat has 
passed away and there will be no further radical re-structuring of what turned out to 
be dogmatic slumbers. It is worth noting that, in person, Pat was a civil, humorous 
man who loved company. When he chose also to be convivial, he was a generous and 
gracious host who did what truly great hosts do – he made people of all ages feel 
delighted with themselves, and with the occasion just attended, to the point of not 
noticing the expertise of their host. 
 It makes it even more extraordinary that the work is perhaps the most austere and 
formidable philosophical-scientific achievement of the past century. But for quack 
radiation treatment as far back as the 1930’s – for acne! – Pat, a force of nature if ever 
there was one, might have expected to continue productive well into his second 
century. 
While Pat’s earlier work on economics, psychology and the philosophy of science 
achieved justified world renown, it is the sustained attack on problems of mind and 
world that occupied his later energies. This book is a Festschrift, from Hintikka to 
Fenstad to his friend, the Nobel laureate Ken Arrow. The later might agree with me 
that Pat’s brilliance as an administrator – he had over 200 working under him at one 
point – and multidisciplinary gifts is what prevented him from achieving the ultimate 
distinction of a Nobel Prize to accompany by 1990 National medal for Science. 
This review will follow the book in dividing Pat’s work into separate categories. 
While Pat himself responded – from his deathbed, as events turned out – there is much 
more than can be said to which this review is a humble contribution. There is a 
separate volume on his anticipation of MOOCS and successful educational business 
career that should itself  be the subject of more attention (Suppes, 2013). 
The book begins with a foreword by the co-editor Longino and an overview by 
Michael Friedman. The latter in particular is engaged with Suppes as a philosopher of 
science. Some background is necessary; in particular the relationship between Suppes 
and Carnap needs to be unpacked. It will be argued here that Suppes ended by 
resembling Carnap’s nemesis Wittgenstein – a name oddly mentioned only once in 
this volume – more than he might have cared to admit. 
The Vienna circle thrived in the teens of the 20th century; around the time of Pat’s 
service in WW2   the pincer attacks by Gödel and the later Wittgenstein began to 
wreak havoc in what had been a formidable intellectual edifice. That edifice was 
constructed on painstaking analysis of language, including the language used to 
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express scientific theories, as the royal road to understanding the relationship between 
mind and world. Carnap exemplified this new linguistic philosophy; to simplify, 
theories were to be expressed as a set of “protocol sentences” in which all the terms 
would have a clear semantic denotation.  
The early Wittgenstein brought this argument to its apotheosis. What existed were 
“states of affairs“ (Sachverhalten); these could be analysed into atomic facts 
(Tatsachen). Language was, in deeply encoded form, a set of pictorial representations; 
the task of the scientist was to analyse sentences into atomic propositions and map 
these logical atoms onto atomic facts. This mapping, argued the early (Tractatus) 
Wittgenstein could be done by a “private language” idiosyncratic to each person as the 
instruction set is idiosyncratic to each microprocessor. It will not have escaped the 
attentive reader that this is essentially the programme of 20th century GOFAI; please 
see my 2003 book. 
Wittgenstein later recanted these views, and began a phase that looks frankly 
nihilistic; better put, he became a philosophical “edifier” rather in the style of Suppes’ 
late Stanford colleague Rorty. There could not exist such private languages, argues the 
later (Investigations) Wittgenstein; we can only consider language in the context of 
encompassing life-situations called “language games” Indeed, if we fail to acknowledge 
this, we might end in the absurdity of asking questions like “What is a question?” 
It is this fatal self-reference that Gödel’s formalist, and perhaps stronger, 
arguments take as their target. While Wittgenstein, the emigrant aeronautics engineer 
who (unlike Pat) spurned his family’s wealth, was at best a tangent to the Vienna circle, 
Gödel was intrinsic to its program. Thus, when he produced a convincing 
demonstration that systems of a power >= standard arithmetic were either provably 
consistent or fit for purpose (never both), the shock was deep. This underlies also 
Turing’s response to Hilbert’s Entscheidungsproblem, a proof that there exists no 
universal computational procedure, and arguably a leitmotif for 21st century research 
on consciousness. 
Pat argued for a set-theoretic view of scientific structures; the 2002 book 
considered by many to be his masterpiece extends this paradigm to the many fields we 
will visit in this review. It is fair to say that he had backed away from this optimism by 
the time of his passing. 
He is often perceived as backing a “semantic” set-theoretic view over Carnap’s 
“formal languages” view. As Friedman points out in his overview, this is simplistic; as 
Longino points out, use of scientific constructs in new contexts, like harmonic 
oscillators in neuroscience, is viewed as merely pragmatically useful. Friedman is also 
at pains to distinguish the more sophisticated Suppesian epistemology from the 
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minimalism of Carnap’s Tractatus-like “correspondence” theory; for Suppes, 
representational structures are to mediate between mind and world, and be grounded 
in measurement . All of these concepts are unpacked in the book. 
It is in the role of mathematics that we see the most dramatic instabilities in the 
later Suppes. For him, there really is no longer philosophy of science distinct from 
science itself, nor can science really be divorced from mathematics. A consequence of 
that is the lack of distinction between pure and applied mathematics.  
Suppes is inconsistent on these points, even in this volume; his commentary on 
Falmagne (261-2) shows skepticism about whether the rather baroque formalisms used 
have any denotation. In fact, the skepticism reaches creationist heights that will be 
pointed out in this review of an enjoyable and important volume 
 2. FOUNDATIONS OF MATHEMATICS 
The book proper starts with a rather weak paper called “What numbers are” by 
Fenstad. Weak, because while there is an attempt at a debunking of Wigner’s 
“unreasonable effectiveness of math”, it is clear that neither Suppes nor Fenstad has 
given any serious consideration to the genetic epistemology of Piaget and his followers 
like Bruner. 
While Suppes claims there is no mystery about how often abstract math refers – 
and, as we have seen, he vacillates about its applicability to the real world – Piaget led 
a sustained attack on this issue. Unquestionably, lower animals like birds can 
“subitize”, apparently counting well into the double digits, but Piaget insists that this 
cardination ability does not get synthesized with the capacity to seriate before 
“conservation” status is achieved in human children at about 7 years and with it true 
number emerges for the first time in nature. That may be controversial; what is not to 
be questioned is that Piaget asked the right question as to how the logical necessity of 
math can emerge from the contingent facts of experience. 
Jaakko Hintikka continues with a paper – less baroque than rococo - claiming that 
there is no axiom of choice; it would have been better to see his work on synthesizing 
the two Wittgenstein periods here. Finally, even Pat throws up his hands in 
incomprehension at Harvey Friedman’s paper. 
3. PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 
 The book gets going with this section and Rykman’s well-written and erudite paper 
called “The Structure, the whole structure”. It is absurd to suggest that Carnap is 
syntactic, and Suppes’ set theory semantic; formal languages correspond at each level 
in the Chomsky hierarchy to various set generators. Indeed, a suitably restricted 
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context allows syntax, without semantics, to curtail distributional freedom. In fact, the 
new Suppes looks like a proponent of language games. 
Paul Humphreys continues with “Models of data and inverse methods” He 
invokes Napoletani in arguing that “Big data” may allow us to leave theory behind. As 
of now, that simply is not happening; while data-driven approaches will solve 
deterministic problems like speech to text, they have failed miserably with gene 
expression and other such problems. 
We can quickly pass over de la Sierra’s economics paper, as the great Ken Arrow 
takes the risk of writing a straightforward economics paper; see below. Stephan 
Hartmann with “Imprecise probabilities” correctly suggests non-classical probability 
regimes may work for QM. 
4. MATHEMATICAL REPRESENTATION 
 Duncan Luce, who passed in 2012, invokes “Holder’s theorem” in the context of 
measurement. It is conceivable that this line of thought is effectively dead; so also for 
Falmagne’s “Meaningful, permutable laws” which, as we have seen,  caused even 
Suppes to question whether pure math always has denotation and a link to science. 
Sandwiched between the two is a little gem from Ken Arrow called “The economic 
system as trade in information”. One does not need a moral argument for capitalism, 
argues Arrow; it is simply the case that allowing price to be subject to the market is the 
most efficient way of disseminating information. Arrow alludes to the early experiment 
is socialism, which expected an iterative series of corrections to price-setting by the 
government, as failed. Remarkably, he sees professions like medicine as essentially 
justified by the fact M.D’s have information; in the imminent era of near 100% 
smartphone penetration, professions may no longer be allowed conspire against the 
public.  
Finally, Leitgeb’s “Belief as qualitative probability” provides  a salutary corrective 
to the current mania for quantitative Bayesian nets. It is here, that fugitive transition 
between the subjective and objective, that Suppes so brilliantly defends the chink in his 
armor.  
5. LANGUAGE, MIND, AND LEARNING THEORY 
 For Piaget (see my 2003, 2014 books), logical certainty arises because the organism 
internalizes interactions first carried out at the boundary of subject and object. There 
is nothing like this in the Suppes oeuvre; there is, however, an adaptation of Shannon 
in Skyrms “Learning to signal”.  
While categorically not a genetic epistemologist, Pat was an innovative and 
thorough developmental linguist. Levelt’s “From Rousseau to Suppes” looks at Pat’s 
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excellent corpora, and the prescient development of probabilistic parsers so wrongly 
maligned by Chomsky.  
Neither was Pat a phenomenologist; Follesdal’s daringly titled “Suppes and 
Husserl” has little to say about links between the two. What we get instead is a limpid 
analysis of Husserl’s notion of “Noesis”, roughly speaking the neural hypotheses lined 
up at any given moment (called “preafference” by Walter Freeman – see our 2014 
collection), and the “noema”, constraints on the object. Pat’s response is that of a 
confused friend; what is left out is that the “perpetual beginner in phenomenology” 
that Husserl admitted himself to be admitted defeat in this project. Pat’s emphasis on 
Aristotle might have benefited from the modified realism of his erstwhile colleague 
Karl Pribram – see my 2014 monograph 
6. NEUROSCIENCE   
Like his fellow-American Frank Lloyd Wright, Pat Suppes  experienced a breathtaking 
burst of creativity in the ninth decade of his life. This work, which is being continued 
at Stanford, features the highly technical competent researchers in this section 
bringing a wide artillery of techniques to bear on issues of mind, brain, cognition, and 
epistemology. It is their work which will indicate whether what was being hinted at in 
Pat’s autumn years until his passing in late 2014 is an entirely new language for 
describing humanity’s relationship to reality itself. There are precedents other than 
FLW; Michelangelo’s final pieta anticipated the elongated bodies of el Greco and 
tropes from modern sculpture; Beethoven’s Op 130 anticipates the rhythmic 
innovations of “Le sacre du printemps” as its author Stravinsky was happy to admit 
De Barros and Oas begin this section with “response slection using neural phase 
oscillators”. In my 2014 book, this inheritance of the harmonic oscillator model from 
the “merely physical” realm is inevitable; for Longino in the introduction, we have 
seen caveats. De Barros and Oas follow researchers like Izhekevich in stressing the 
emergent property of synchronization is networks of oscillators. They may exceed their 
remit in arguing, contra 55 years of cognitive science, that stimulus-response structures 
work for language; nevertheless, the hints at quantum cognition, with or without a 
Hilbert space formalism, make this an exciting paper. 
Visitors to Ventura hall since 2000 often found themselves with electrodes attached 
to their scalp for long period, In this context, Carvaelhes argues that non-invasive 
neuroscience is better done with the electric field than potential. There are exciting 
results; along with “Bad math”, the use of diverging infinite sequences in QM, Pat also 
coined the term “extreme statistics” 
Why “extreme statistics”? Well, the alternative is highly invasive surgery, such as 
that done by Edward Chang at UCSF. Consequently, there is a moral impulse 
 COSMOS AND HISTORY 368 
underlying the cleaning up of the signal in Perreau-Guimaraes’ “Similarity pairs 
derived from pairwise classifications”. With some justification, pat argued that words 
are first represented as auditory patterns and that we can recognize them. Invasive 
researchers like Bob Knight of UC Berkeley scorn this approach. Pat, with whom we 
will leave the last word, is very careful not to over-claim for these results. 
Colleen Crangle finishes this section with a paper called “Representation, 
isomorphism and invariance”. This is a leap into the big blue; an attempt to find 
semantic templates in the brain using  resources like wordnet. Pat makes it clear that 
he is skeptical that Colleen and he found these. Given that Knight’s invasive work has 
so far found just phonic data, that is not surprising. 
7. SCIENCE IN PRACTICE  
Fagot-Largeault’s “The psychiatrist’s dilemma” is perhaps the weakest paper in the 
collection. It is included, perhaps, because Pat was about to initiate work on EEG 
monitoring of couples’ dialog. While the tension between drug therapy and talk 
therapy, between genetic and psychodynamic causes, is well-made, there is little there 
there (unlike ironically 2015 buzzing Oakland!). 
Beth Loftus gives a charming account of her 1960’s work with the formidable Dr 
Suppes in the then burgeoning  field of mathematical psychology before venturing 
onto her later, independent work on “Illusions of memory”. Essentially, 
uncorroborated witness statements, even when an attempt to tell the truth, are often 
worse than useless in court. 
The final paper, on Evidence-based policy (“Where rigor matters”) was, rather 
remarkably, funded by the Templeton foundation. Pat is correctly exercised about 
this; as the ex-director of science for a major Irish political party, I am very skeptical 
indeed. 
8. THE ALTERNATIVE; REPARSING NATURE 
It is my belief, expanded on in my 2014 monograph, that Pat’s (2002) self-admitted 
failure to reduce any realm of being to another  - for example, the biological to the 
physical –is due to the fact that ontological discontinuities have logical and 
computational consequences. Physics with constraints begets chemistry; naïve 
nanotechnology chose to ignore the effects of numerical constraints in orbitals on the 
type of molecules that can be created. On entering the biological realm, these 
numerical constraints begin to transform into syntax and semantics. Such projects as 
the HGP and GWAS have plateaued after ignoring these constraints, best handled in 
new subjects like biosemiotics. A reparse of nature involves new academic subjects, 
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and indeed a looser conception of the academy than with which  Pat might have been 
familiar and comfortable. 
It may be clear that I am not convinced that Pat really was interested in 
phenomenology, and that here he had an intellectual center of gravity in subjective 
probability. With that in mind, I believe that it makes sense also to speak of a 
discontinuity in nature on entering the intentional realm. This realm is constrained by 
the requirement  that, unlike simple covariance of the signal between environment and 
organism earlier in evolution, the intentional subject has a formal system >= standard 
arithmetic. 
At this point I wish to speculate. All our senses evince a mystery of transduction 
and an exquisite sensitivity that invite a QM explanation. Husserl, the “perpetual 
beginner in phenomenology”, was onto a massive insight that first became incarnate in 
the frame problem in AI. Moreover, Aristotle simply will not do for perception. I 
speculate; while Bell’s inequalities invite the concept of an entangled nexus at the 
physical level, immanence and universality of biological forma cannot really be 
explained by “convergent evolution”, a simple non-engagement with the issue. 
Intentional creatures like us participate in a Noosphere; while Leibniz may be the 
closest 17th century analogue to Suppes, his duel with Newton – who in the Principia  
did not  use the calculus he allegedly discovered – shows an immanence of Ideas that 
would have pleased Plato. 
9. APOLOGIA, NOT APOLOGY; THE LAST TESTAMENT OF AN AMERICAN 
ORIGINAL 
I wish finally to speak of my relationship with this great and good man. His student 
Alistair Isaac has felt obliged to write an apologia which is part apology. My dealings 
with Pat began with his endorsing  two of my courses for teaching at Stanford, the 
second while he was recovering from yet another surgery. Ironically, given his 
academic conservatism,  it was he who endorsed my biosemiotics course – the third in 
the world – for teaching at Stanford and who repeatedly took me in, almost off the 
street, after certain abusive experiences in Ireland (see my 2013 book) made it 
impossible for me to work in my home country. Finally on this topic, while engaged 
with gifted youth, the companion CSLI volume (Suppes, 2013) shows his 
compassionate and thoroughly-researched engagement with  blind, deaf and mentally 
retarded children. For Pat the political libertarian, the champion of economic 
inequality, it was all about realization of human potential to a degree that the Rand 
Paul presidential candidacy might echo. 
A now elderly Finn who worked with Pat spoke of his superb eye for talent, 
coupled with his insistence that the talent, once hired, stick to whatever last Pat 
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prescribed. That is very much consistent with being a third generation oilman; yet 
Pat’s stentorian demands for reports, the last within a week of his death, never ended 
up with dismissals. 
Had he stayed working for his Dad, who insisted on his starting with pick and 
shovel, Pat would likely have become an Okie oil billionaire. In reality, he spent the 
last 64 years of his life at Stanford, living on campus after his grandmother loaned him 
the money for his first house. The fact remains that his work is rooted in the scientific 
approach of his, the “great generation”, with all is virtues and drawbacks.  
The virtues are clear; precision, honesty, hard work. The drawbacks may be 
related to the fact that, unlike the present, the USA was engaged in war with a series of 
technologically sophisticated adversaries. It was important to try and axiomatize 
measurement before someone else did, to find enhancements for human performance 
among Americans before the Russians did so among themselves. For all its 
importation of scientists, the USA did not ever claim to have produced Sakharov’s 
equal. 
Pat’s drive to axiomatization resembled a compulsion; his failure to succeed as his 
self-inflicted programme demanded resulted in what looks like a deathbed conversion 
to Wittgensteinian skepticism. This writer believes that conversion to be ill-motivated 
rather than insincere; Isaac’s piece comments on Pat’s (2002) dissatisfaction at failing 
to reduce any science to axioms. In fact, edifier as he had become, Pat regarded 
foundational discussion as necessary only when progress in science resulted in 
antinomies, like when Bell’s theorems necessitated new theories of non-classical 
probability. 
To say, as Pat does  in this book, that fossils are too far in the past for us to induce 
any certainty, means for many of us that he simply had set the bar too high. The 
skeptical argument that scientific theory is vastly under-determined by data goes back 
at least to David Hume. The converse problem – the deluge of neuroscientific data 
that Pat believes will drown the reminder of this century – is troubling only for those 
who hope for a set of atomic facts. 
Once one leaves the academy, which Pat did rather too rarely, definitions of 
“knowledge” and “certainty” emerge from folk psychology which in the right hands, 
may lead to a complete reparse of nature. This I achieve to some extent in my 2014 
book; its first insight is that truth changes its stripes at the perimeter of campus. 
Skeptical arguments by Gödel and others acquire traction, until the world of platonic 
objects and free will  that Gödel and his colleagues like Von Neumann envisaged now 
seem the rule, rather than a mere technical objection, later to be dispensed with 
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Hundreds of $ billions are currently being spent each year on doomed, ill-
conceived research projects. This money has largely become a perverse incentive; 
there is more  research money to be had through sticking to an outdated paradigm 
and continuing to write about its incremental success than actually solving the 
problem. Google recently solved the “speech to text with no prior training” problem; 
had they not done so, billions more would have been wasted on “more fundamental” 
approaches.  
In neuroscience, Obama’s brain project is headed by Christof Koch; a C+H 
article (see my 2014 edited collection here; my paper with Tom Doris is the one in 
question) we wrote in 2014  was sent to him along with an offer to share the data. It 
proves Koch’s “Phi” notion is wrong; however, there is so ouch money sloshing 
around that Koch is free, a la the Queen of Tarts, to define “neuron” and 
“information” as he wills. Along with Google, Suppes never made this error. 
Conversely, had Pat lived what seemed to all of us to be his allotted five score and 
ten, there would right now be an undergraduate with the elements of a new technique 
gravitating toward him.. By 2020, Pat would have formalized the technique, papers 
would be published in genuinely good journals, and the cycle would continue. I 
suspect that much of the funding for this type of work, as with the centers he funded at 
Stanford, came from Pat’s own pocket 
Those who did not know him can skip the forbidding American English syntax of 
his main oeuvre for the moment; his commentaries on each of these papers are 
recognizably Pat, the friend and mentor , and a real American original. You will enjoy 
your new friendship with this truly great man. 
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